Discrimination in
State University Housing ProgramsPolicy and Constitutional Consideration WILLIAM w. VAN ALsTYNE'::: In nearly all major state universities today, substantial numbers of students are obliged to live off-campus in private apartments or rooming houses.
1 Rather than cast these students into unfamiliar neighborhoods to find suitable accommodations by chance, most of these universities maintain some facility which refers students to landlords who have registered with the university. Typically, the privilege of registering is limited to those landlords who comply with university standards of health, safety, and supervision with respect to such things as visiting hours and alcohol control. Notwithstanding the availability of such services, however, racial and religious barriers cause certain groups of students to experience unusual difficulty in locating adequate housing.
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The existence of racial discrimination in registered, off-campus housing raises several issues of policy and law. With respect to policy, there is evidently some difference of opinion as to a university's responsibility to provide its student body ·with a nonsegregated environment, particularly with respect to off-campus, privately owned housing. A representative survey of state universities outside the Deep South indicates that seventeen of forty-three universities have resolved that a willingness to accept all qualified students, regardless of race or color, is a reasonable condition to require of landlords registered with those universities. 3 There may "Assistant Dean and Assistant Professor of Law, The Ohio State University. B.A., University of Southern California, 1955; LL.B., Stanford University, 1958.
1. See Appendix at p. 78, infra, for a survey of state universities which maintain offcampus housing facilities. Southern universities were not canvassed because the great majority continue to be segregated, thus raising no problem in the off-campus housing of Negro students. Private universities were not surveyed since their housing practices do not raise the same constitutional issues, although some of these universities do enforce nondiscrimination policies against registered landlords, e.g., Harvard be some modest question whether enforcement of such a condition through a threat to delist discriminatory landlords unconstitution~ ally deprives them of property without due process, though the answer now appears to be quite clear. With respect to other uni~ versities which maintain substantial connections with discrimi~ natory landlords and which do not enforce any policy against such discrimination, however, a more serious question exists as to whether these universities may unwittingly be violating the four~ teenth amendment's guarantee of equal protection. The purpose of this article is to review briefly the choice of values implicit in the policies of each group of universities, and to discuss the con~ stitutionality of those policies. 4 
Policy Considerationi
Whether the constitutional vehicle has been the due process clause, 6 or the equal protection clause/ objections by landlords to state action restricting their capacity to discriminate because of race are fundamentally bound up with an alleged "right" or "preroga~ tive" of nonassociation. 8 Out of context, the assertion of such a 5. This attempt to restate the normative principles involved in the "right" of nonassociation versus the "right" of equal access, is a self-conscious response to Samuel Johnson's reflections on the law: "SIR ALE..'CANDER: 'The bar is not so abusive as it was formerly. I fancy they had less law long ago, and were obliged to take to abuse to fill up the time. Now they have such a number of precedents, they have no occasion for abuse.' JOHNSON: 'Nay, Sir, they had more law long ago than they have now. As prerogative is not without appeal. Essentially, the interest involved in such an assertion rests on a value judgment that a man's selection of associates, either as friends, business associates, or tenants, ought not be hedged about with state imposed notions of right and wrong which, in the last analysis, enjoy no divine guarantee of excellence or superiority. For a state institution to compel a landlord to lease part of what he owns to those whom he considers undesirable may be viewed as infringing on his freedom of choice and abridging the significance of ownership. A property owner's interest in nonassociation does not exist in a vacuum, however; the uncontrolled exercise of such an interest may trample under foot competing interests of even higher value. Balanced against the pristine interest of property owners in declining to deal even on arbitrary bases and to make irrelevant differences of color the grounds for distinguishing among men, is the interest of the adversely affected class to pursue its opportunities in society free of artificial barriers not thrown up against others. In the case at hand, it is the interest of Negroes in equal access to facilities which are open to others. A juxtaposition of this claim of equal opportunity for housing with the claim of nonassociation indicates that both cannot be completely satisfied in all situations.
In the context of university housing programs, the better case clearly lies with those asserting an interest in equal access. It may be (though not persuasively, I think) argued that discrimination against Negroes with respect to casual interests, such as equal access to malt shops and country clubs, ought not be placed above the proprietors' or the club members' interest in nonassociation even though the exclusion arbitrarily stigmatizes those who are rejected. 9 cerned not with a legally enforceable claim, but rather with a philosophic claim or value judgment that there is some legitimacy in the interest of each person to determine his associations, regardless of his reasons.
9. Note, however, that the Supreme Court has held that segregation even in state operated facilities of recreation, amusement, and transportation is unconstitutional. Since the Brown Court stressed the harmful effects of segregation only in education, Brown v. Board of Educ., supra at 494, and since it expressly limited its holding to segre-It can scarcely be doubted, however, that when discrimination is practiced in housing, and against students still in their formative years/ 0 the effect is more certainly an abridgment of a fundamental interest in democratic education, by forcing them into ghetto-like living which prejudices their whole existence-an interest clearly more critical than the landlord's desire for unrestricted use of the housing lists.
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Also relevant as a matter of policy in balancing these competing interests is the amount of discrimination involved. It may be argued that if but a few landlords exclude Negroes, the latter's interest in equal access has been only slighdy disturbed; presumably, they still enjoy access to many other nonsegregated houses of at least equal physical accommodation. But when the capacity to discriminate (euphemistically disguised as a "prerogative of nonassociation") is exercised so extensively that the minority's hope of securing desired goals is cut off, the principle of equal opportunity has in fact given way to a cruel and inexplicable tyranny of the many, clearly not justifiable under the rubric of "ownership" or any other such notion.
12 Parenthetically, it may be noted that 634-38 (1958) , reviving the argument that the fourteenth amendment must be construed to prohibit substantial abuses of power whether e.xercised by the "state" politic or the "state" economic. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) .
Still another approach towards eradicating racial discrimination in an area of fundamental concern where prejudice by a majority seriously affects basic interests, is suggested in BLAUSTEIN & FERGUSON, DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW 266 (1957) .
"A change in the meaning of state action ean also be accomplished by reintroducing into this area of constitutional thinking some basic common law principles. Some future Supreme Court might well hold that any activity which affects large numbers of the general public automatically becomes a matter of governmental concern, and thus falls within the state action concept. Under such an analysis the services of hotels, restaurants and theaters would have to be made available to the general public without regard to race. [Compare the dissent of Justice Harlan in Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).] This was the old English common law rule governing inns and common carriers, since those facilities are inherendy public in character. And while housing was not of public concern at common law, present-day, large-scale housing developments could be declared a matter of government interest within the conte.xt of the Fourteenth Amendment. This approach would [Vol. r3: Page 6o the "prerogative of nonassociation" as a personal interest often is not genuinely involved in university off-campus housing, since rental units may be owned by absentee landlords, rather than by families renting but a single room in their own homes. In reconciling these considerations of policy, and in relating them to the police power of the state, it would appear that the state could reasonably determine that the effect of discrimination in this situation 13 is more harmful to some than the effect of nondiscrimination on others who oppose it. The philosophy of the fourteenth amendmene4 suggests the persuasive policy argument to be made for a state institution's withholding support from discriminatory landlords. Indeed, since housing discrimination is unlikely to end through voluntary means/ 6 the argument in favor of positive state action becomes most compelling.
That State Universities May Enforce a Policy of Nondiscrimination in Registered Housing
While the Supreme Court has not passed direcdy upon the power of a state to compel nondiscrimination in "private" housing by penal sanctions, two states are sufficiendy confident of the constitutionality of such legislation that they have placed it on their statute books. 16 Additionally, the highest courts of two states have upheld the constitutionality of the application of antidiscrimination legislation to private housing where the financing was insured preclude racial discrimination in these private activities regardless of any specific action on the part of the state and regardless of whether the state had ever undertaken such activities in the past. 13. The need for exacting inquiry into the factual and policy consequences implicit in constitutional decisions which necessarily prefer one value over another in a given context is persuasively presented in Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, I Su-PRE:ME CoURT REVIEW {to be published).
14. In a case upholding the right of a state to withhold facilities from racially discriminatory labor unions, the Supreme Court approved the state's policy in the following terms: "[A] State may choose to put its authority behind one of the cherished aims of American feeling by forbidding indulgence in racial or religious prejudice to another's hurt. To use the Fourteenth Amendment as a sword against such state power would stultify that Amendment. Certainly the insistence by individuals on their private prejudices as to race, color or creed, in relations like those now before us, ought not to have a higher constitutional sanction than the determination of a State to extend the area of nondiscrimination beyond that which the Constitution itself exacts." Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. by the federal government. 17 In the more recent decision, the United States Supreme Court dismissed an appeal for want of a substantial federal question.
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Against this background, the case of a university housing officer's power merely to withhold special services from discrimi~ natory landlords is indeed an easy one; by instituting such a policy, the university does not affirmatively require any landlord to sur~ render his prejudices or to abrogate his prerogatives. Rather, it limits the privilege of sharing a captive market of students and enjoying the free services of university advertising and referral personnel to those landlords who are willing to treat all qualified students with equal respect and accommodation. The right of the university to impose such a condition is probably greater than the power of the state~at-large, because of its pronounced respon~ sibility for the welfare of its student body.
19 A university's respon~ sibility to provide a nonsegregated atmosphere for its students has been acknowledged by the Supreme Court to extend beyond the walls of the classroom. 20 Indeed, the right of a state university to ban fraternities affiliated with national organizations in an effort to stop racial discrimination, has been upheld in the federal courts. 21 And, finally, it is not without significance that none of the state universities which presendy maintain nondiscriminatory policies in off~ampus housing have been challenged in court. The dichotomy is, of course, self-evident. It merits restatement here, only to emphasize that two separate classes of possible defendants are involved in university housing programs: the universities and the landlords. It will be found that the constitutional problems with respect to the former relate almost exclusively to the issue of the type of conduct involved, while the problems with respect to the latter relate almost exclusively to de~ termining whether they are the state for purposes of the four~ teenth amendment/ 6 an issue not covered in this article. Our borne in mind that the Court has definitely moved toward an upgrading of the states' interests in a nonsegregated educational environment, at the same time it has tended to minimize the significance of private property rights. immediate concern is with the officers of state universities who operate the housing offices, and possibly with university trustees or regents who promulgate rules governing operation of the housing offices. As to these, it is well settled that their actions are the actions of the state for purposes of the equal protection clause.
27
The significant question is whether the practice of university officers connected with an off-campus housing program embracing discriminatory housing is conduct of a kind which denies equal protection. The answer will depend upon the type of program involved. If the university denies minority students access to houses which it owns or leases, and the denial is identified with the students' race or color, the conduct is of a proscribed kind; exclusion Cir. 1946 for racial reasons has been held consistently to deny equal protection. The more typical situation, however, relates to university referral policies with respect to registered houses which are privately owned. The university's procedure with respect to these houses is not conduct which excludes a person from a state facility, for the only state facility immediately involved is not the rooming house, but rather a university office. And the policy of the university is not to exclude from or segregate minority students in the use of this office, but only to follow a different procedure in referring them to off-campus houses than is followed for white students. The question becomes, then, whether the difference in the referral procedure is of a prohibited kind. Taken in conjunction with other university rules, it may be prohibited because of the discriminatory effect the total university policy has upon minority students.
Assume, for instance, that the university has a rule that all undergraduate students (or more typically, all undergraduate female students) must live on campus or in registered rooming houses. Assume also that the housing office has been advised by various landlords that they will not accept minority students, and in deference to these landlords the office does not include these houses on listings made available to minority students. The net effect of the whole operation is that the university has affirmatively compelled some students to live only in certain registered houses, a restriction based only on race. The practice is obviously conduct of a kind which denies equal protection. Even if the university does not prevent its students from living in unregistered houses, a policy of refusing minority students access to complete housing lists, where certain houses are withheld only for racial reasons, is probably a denial of equal protection as well. Such a policy may operate much like a zoning ordinance restricting the leasing and purchase of some private property on grounds of race or color. Similarly, the university has withheld information necessary to locate certain housing accommodations, while the information is made available to others not of the same race.
The net effect is to cut off student access to certain houses-a state policy exercised only with respect to minority students. Ordinances of this type have been held unconstitutional since 1917, 31 and it should make no difference whether the practice stems from legislative fiat by a municipal council, or executive fiat by a state university office.
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It might be thought, however, that the purpose of a state uni~ versity's reluctance to refer minority students to discriminatory landlords should be controlling, and since that purpose may not be to injure the minority students, any discriminatory effect is strictly incidental and not of a constitutional magnitude. The Court has indicated, however, that it is the fact of state participation in a discriminatory scheme which violates the equal protection clause, regardless of the purpose for which it is done. 33 Thus, it is no de- fense for a state institution to claim that it must withhold certain listings from minority students to prevent discriminatory landlords from withdrawing from the university housing program. If a state facility cannot operate "successfully" without discriminating racially, then it is not constitutionally entitled to operate at all.
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It might also be thought that use of a housing office is a matter of privilege, a special consideration that the university extends as a matter of grace, and that since students originally had no legal right to insist even upon the existence of such a facility, they can hardly complain of being denied any part of its services. But this objection is true even with respect to a university education itselfthat the state is under no constitutional obligation to maintain a university. Nevertheless where the state has resolved to establish such facilities, it must make them available free of racial distinctions. Analytically, it is improper to consider popular resistance, loss of property values, etc., as possible defenses to conduct already asserted to be a denial of equal protection, for this is to make the self-contradictory statement that one may properly act unconstitutionally under certain circumstances. Rather, the proffered defense is a part of the interest weighed initially in determining whether the conduct is constitutional.
34. "Successfully" is intended in the sense of effectuating its legitimate interest in housing. Sec Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 13 (1958}, where the Court acknowledged defendant school board's argument that integration had cast a "serious financial burden" on the school district and that "the education of the students had suffered and under e:cisting conditions will continue to suffer," because of the resistance of the white community; the Court held that these considerations would not justify maintaining the schools on a segregated basis. The result was foreshadowed in the second Brown case, 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955), where the Court stated: "[I]t should go without saying that the vitality of these constitutional principles cannot be allowed to yield simply because of disagreement with them," apparendy including manifestations of disagreement such as a drop in total school attendance which might result from popular resistance to integration.
35. "The question here is not of a duty of the State to supply • • • training, or of the quality of the training which it docs supply, but of its duty when it provides such training to furnish it to the residents of the State upon the basis of an equality of right." Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 349 (1938) . "Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms." Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493, 38 A.L.R.2d 1180, 1186 (1954).
36. "Whether or not it be a property right which the housing authority 'creates and
7I
The housing policy at many universities falls short of the types thus far discussed, however, and drops into the twilight zone of constitutionality. These universities may list all registered land~ lords and make the whole list available to all students regardless of race or color; the housing office may not even know which landlords discriminate, or if it does know, it does not use this knowledge to withhold any addresses from minority students.
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The act of discrimination thus is exercised only by the landlord when the student applies to him personally.
If the mere maintenance of a referral office which services land~ lords, some of whom discriminate, is conduct of a kind which denies equal protection, it must be unconstitutional only because it fosters, facilitates, or "substantially" aids private discrimination, and not because discrimination is practiced by the state university itself. The Supreme Court has never decided whether such a prac~ tice does violate the equal protection clause, principally because cases of this nature almost uniformly have been brought against the real estate owner who has discriminated, rather than against the state agency directly or indirectly assisting the owner. 88 Discu~ sion in these cases with respect to the state encouraging or aiding discrimination has not been directed to the issue of permissible conduct by the state, but to the issue of "state action" in the conduct of the real estate owner. 39 It is not at all clear from these cases that 37. It is, perhaps, arguable that if the university housing office is aware of which landlords will not accept Negroes and yet refers a Negro student to such landlords, the office has damaged him "by subjecting him both to psychological injury and to an unnecessary con- connections between a state and a property owner sufficient to identify the owner as a state agent whose conduct is wrongful, carry over to render the conduct of the state wrongful. 500 (1959) , where the Attorney General suggests that the issue of the state rmivero-ity's permissible conduct (not the conduct of the fraternities themselves), is partly dependent upon the degree of "strict controls" it exercises over fraternities and the "substantial benefits and advantages" it confers. Whether or not the university strictly controls but does not thereby "aid" landlords in matters such as health and safety inspections, alcohol and moral conduct, these connections have no relevance to the permissibility of the university's referral policy; rather, these elements go only to identifying the fraternities as state agencies so that their conduct, which involves a total e.xclusion of Negroes and is thus clearly impermissible behavior, can be reached ilirough the fourteenth amendment. squarely in responding to a legislator's question whether the action of state redevelopment agencies in servicing listings of discriminatory landlords was conduct prohibited by the fourteenth amendment. The Attorney General found that the maintenance of such a service was a violation of equal protection because it was governmental action which had the practical effect of encouraging and fostering discrimination by private persons. In his view, the fourteenth amendment does not "countenance active sponsorship" by such an agency of racial discrimination by private landlords.
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The Opinion is open to serious question, however, because the principal authorities upon which it relied were the restrictive covenant cases involving the question of the existence of state action.
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Moreover, in neither of the cases cited was a state agency the defendant. The Attorney General anticipated the enormous implication of his opinion by observing that the principle that no state agency may conduct itself in such a manner as to assist private discrimination was subject to certain exceptions. Thus, he did not propose that police and fire protection must be withdrawn from property owners who discriminate/ 5 stating that such assistance "only incidentally and passively" benefits private discrimination/ 6 A federal court has since held that the furnishing of water and sewage services by state agencies to a tract developer who refused to sell to Negroes, is not conduct of a kind prohibited by the fourteenth amendment. 47 The case is particularly significant, because the state agency itself was joined as defendant.
That special assistance to property owners who discriminate is proscribed by the equal protection clause is, however, supported by dicta in The clear suggestion is that it would be a denial of equal protection for the administering agency to assist discriminatory property owners with federal aid. 5°
In one sense, the line separating permissible from impermissible state assistance to property owners who discriminate may appear to be illogical in terms of the difference between "necessary" and merely "helpful" aid. Thus, state provided services such as police and fire protection, or water and sewage supply, are practically indispensable to the property owner and constitute a necessary condition, of his continued discrimination. Yet, other services such as state referrals of tenants or state insurance may be only helpful to the property owner, and without them he might still operate successfully and discriminate at will. Why, then, should state agencies be prohibited from supplying the latter form of aid to discriminatory property owners, but not the former ? 51. One distinction, occasionally attempted, is to contrast permissible state aid which renders a service essential to the welfare of the community, with impermissible aid which confers more of a direct benefit to the immediate landowner, a benefit not essential to the community at large. The distinction may be helpful in explaining the use of state fire protection services even in behalf of discriminatory property holders, on the ground that fires would otherwise spread to others, but that is about as far as it goes. Municipal water, Part of the answer may be simply that the wrongfulness of the state's conduct is not a matter of causation, but one of the state's participation in and intimate relationship to the subject matter of the discriminatory scheme itself; the business of supplying water or removing sewage is not the business of placing persons in houses and does not carry the same responsibility in securing equal treatment for those being placed. And part of the answer must necessarily be a question of policy as to how far the Supreme Court wishes to obliterate the distinction between private and state action under the fourteenth amendment. If state agencies can be enjoined from providing police protection to those who discriminate, or from providing utilities to landlords who discriminate, or from licensing businesses which discriminate, what remains of the state-private division in the fourteenth amendment will have vanished for all practical purposes. By limiting state responsibility to supplying special, or new kinds of services only to those who do not abuse those very services through racial discrimination, some temporary balance between the constitutional duty of states not to foster discrimination and the residual private "right" of nonassociation may be struck.
Whatever the situation may be with respect to independent state housing offices, it is more likely that the close tie of university approved housing to the educational process will mean that registration and servicing of landlords who discriminate will be held to foster discrimination in a manner constituting a denial of equal protection. It is safe to assume that many state universities do not merely list the landlords and make referrals to them from students who accidentally hear that such a list is available; rather, a certain amount of free advertising may be provided through campus publications and through the distribution of placards to registered landlords who display them in a window. And certainly where the university requires any segment of the student body to live in approved housing, whether or not the university itself racially screens the students, the supplying of such a captive market to the landgas, and electrical utilities are of direct, personal benefit to a discriminatory landowner, yet withholding them would hardly threaten the nondiscriminatory neighborhood at large. Government postal deliveries are hardly critical to the community, and are of direct, personal benefit to the homeowner, yet it has not been suggested that the fifth amendment obliges the Government to withhold postal service from discriminatory homeowners! The test of "essential community welfare" would appear to be a phantom, providing no reliable standard to predict the type of state assistance the Supreme Court is likely to subject to fourteenth amendment equal protection conditions. lords might well be viewed as very substantial assistance. Considering also that such programs emanate not from an isolated state office, the sole function of which is to provide housing referrals, but from institutions of higher learning where housing is intimately associated with an educational atmosphere seriously affecting young minds and ideas, it is entirely possible that the Supreme Court would hold these programs unconstitutional. 5 z 52. As noted in te.xt at note 22 supra, the Supreme Court has emphasized the obligation of state universities to provide a nonsegregated atmosphere for its students beyond the classroom itself. In a case involving, among other things, the seating of a Negro student at a separate university cafeteria table, the Court employed the following broad language in holding that such a practice violated the equal protection clause: "[T)he State, in administering the facilities it affords for professional and graduate study, sets [ 
